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1 Introduction  
    In the absence of any market failures, perfectly competitive labor markets without the presence of 
distortionary taxes and combined with profit maximizing behavior of firms imply that real wages 
should equal marginal product of labor. When competitive firms take product and factor prices as 
given and maximize their profit function, it is immediate from the profit maximization problem of the 
firms that real wages should be equal to marginal product of labor. 
   However, various distortions or inefficiencies manifesting themselves as wedges might create a gap 
between the marginal product  of labor and real wages. In this paper, we study the Turkish 
manufacturing industry and find that there exist a significant widening gap
4 between real wages and 
marginal product of labor over the period 1950-2009. We use different time-series econometric 
techniques and show that, among various potential economic factors, this gap is foremost (positively) 
correlated with the unemployment rate over the period of study. This observation is robust to different 
econometric specifications. On the other hand, potential factors other than unemployment; such as 
inflation, capital deepening, size of the informal sector and taxes do not seem to play a significant role 
in determining the observed wage-productivity gap in the data. Moreover, when being made subject to 
multivariate cointegration analysis, the data reveals that there exist a long-run relationship between the 
wage-productivity gap, unemployment rate and number of strikes
5
   The gap between productivity and real wages has been extensively studied in the literature. 
Researchers not only have used aggregate data to analyze this issue, but also found evidence towards 
the existence of such a gap from plant-level or firm-level data. Some examples include but are not 
limited to Persky and Tsang (1974), Zavodny (1999), Maliranta and Ilmakunnas (2005), and more 
recently Sulis (2008).  
 (which is interpreted as a proxy for 
the bargaining power of workers) and the positive correlation between unemployment and the wage-
productivity gap goes along with declining bargaining power Moreover, to provide an economic 
mechanism for this relationship we develop a search model of employment with endogenous 
bargaining. Our model implies that this observation is consistent with declining bargaining power of 
the workers, which is also supported by the data as explained above. 
 
Moreover, there are also a number of studies analyzing the Turkish labor market from a similar 
perspective of ours. Berument, Dogan and Tansel (2006, 2009) investigate the behavior of 
unemployment with respect to macroeconomic policies and economic performance. Similarly, Agenor 
et. al. (2005) and Telli, Voyvoda and Yeldan (2006) analyze the effects of economic policy adjustment 
on unemployment in Turkey. Much more closely related to our paper, Ilkkaracan and Selim (2003) 
                                                           
4 We use the ratio of marginal productivity of labor (MPL) to real wages as a measure of the gap between productivity and 
wages.  
5 Results do not change qualitatively when we use unionization rate instead of the number of strikes as a proxy for bargaining 
power. 3 
 
find evidence towards the existence of a so-called “wage curve”, i.e. a negative correlation between 
regional unemployment rates and wages in Turkey. A more recent paper by Bayraktar Saglam and 
Gunalp (2012) investigates the efficiency of the Turkish labor market from the view of the Beveridge 
curve and finds evidence towards the existence of structural problems and rigidities in the Turkish 
labor market. In the literature on the Turkish labor market, our paper is distinct in the sense that it 
analyzes the Turkish manufacturing sector from an aggregate perspective and documents the existence 
of a positive correlation between the wage-productivity gap and unemployment. Moreover, to the best 
of our knowledge, our paper is unique in accounting for this relationship using a search-theoretic 
model, which also helps to find the economic mechanism behind this observation. 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 first lays out our empirical findings about the 
behavior of wages and marginal product of labor in the manufacturing sector of the Turkish economy. 
In this section, we also empirically document which factor(s) might possible be associated with the 
wage-productivity. Section 3 presents our model. Finally, section 4 concludes. Proofs of the two 
propositions we state in section 3 are delegated to the appendix. 
 
2 Empirical Analysis 
  This section consists of four subsections. In the first one, we explain our data sources and 
particularly, how we create the marginal product of labor series. In the next subsection we document 
the evolution of the econometric variables and report results of a simple regression analysis which 
provides the first pass of the support for the existence of a positive correlation between wage-
productivity gap and the unemployment rate. Then, in the third subsection we use cointegration 
techniques with and without the presence of a possible structural break to analyze the long run 
relationship between wage-productivity gap and the unemployment rate. Finally, the last subsection 
shows that bargaining power of workers play an important role in the relationship documented in the 
previous two subsections. 
 
2.1 Data 
    We assume that the production in the manufacturing sector is characterized by the following 
constant returns to scale production function: 
                                                     
1
t t tt Y AK L
α  −α  =                                                                           (1) 
 
Here Yt is the total value added in manufacturing, Kt is the amount of capital and Lt is  the amount of 
labor used in production. In order to calculate marginal product of labor, defined by MPL = (1 - α) Yt / 
Lt, we need an estimate of the capital share α. We obtain such an estimate by running the following 4 
 
regression equation: 
                                                                                    (2) 
 
Here, obviously εt is the error term. Moreover, in order to create the capital series we employ the 
widely used perpetual inventory method using the following system of equations: 
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  Equation (3) is simply the standard law of motion of capital. Equation (4) is based on the 
assumption that the capital-output ratio of the initial period should match the average capital-output 
ratio over some reference period. Here, we choose the capital stock so that the capital-output ratio in 
1950 matches its average over 1951 - 1960. These two equations, along with the amount of investment 
in year t, , allows us to obtain the series of   , for all years t. 
  Estimating equation 2 above
6
1 β  yields an estimate for α i.e. the estimated value of   turns out to 
be  1 0.5 b = . Considering other studies on Turkey, such as Ismihan and Metin-Ozcan (2006) or Altug, 
Filiztekin and Pamuk (2008), such a high value for the capital share is not surprising.  
  Once we have an estimate of α, we can easily create the marginal product of labor series, i.e. 
 and hence the MPL-to-W ratio.
7 This is what Persky and Tsang (1974) define 
as the Pigouvian exploitation rate.
8
  According to Persky and Tsang (1974), variables that might have an effect on this ratio are; 
inflation rate, capital deepening (defined as the percentage change in the capital-output ratio), and the 
unionization rate.  Additionally, another variable that can strongly affect the evolution of MPL-to-W 
ratio is the level of marginal taxes on the labor income
 In this study we will also refer to it as the wage-productivity gap. 
(or shortly gap) 
9
                                                           
6 We do not present details of this estimation, as this has been extensively done by others and our estimate is not disturbingly 
different from other studies cited above.  
. Finally, motivating from our intention to 
provide a search-theoretic mechanism behind the evolution of the wage-productivity gap we will also 
include unemployment rate among the explanatory variables. Also, suspecting that the measure for the 
7 Real wage series in manufacturing is obtained from Statistical Yearbooks of TURKSTAT. 
8 Also see, Flatau (2001) for more details on Pigouvian exploitation. 
9 This is immediate from the profit maximization problem of a firm. If the firm pays taxes on it’s output, one can obtain 
MPL(1 − tax) = w. Alternatively, if the firm pays taxes on wages then MPL = (1 + tax) W 5 
 
unionization rate in Turkey might be prone to a significant measurement error
10
   Descriptive statistics of all the variables are provided in Table 1. We are using annual data in a time 
span of 60 years from 1950 to 2009. 
, in some regressions 
we instrument it on the number of strikes in a given year. We will include all these variables in the 




  Data needed to create the capital stock series in manufacturing sector is obtained from the State 
Planning Organization (SPO) and statistical yearbooks of the TURKSTAT. Wage data is extracted 
from the OECF and series for the output and employment in manufacturing and inflation are from 
SPO. (CPI based) Data for unionization and strikes are from Şahin (2002), Çelik and Lordoğlu (2006) 
and Ministry of Labor and Social Security websites, respectively. For the marginal taxes on labor 
income we rely on the findings of Cicek and Elgin (2011 a, b). 
 
2.2 First Pass of Empirical Analysis 
Figure 1 shows the ratio of marginal product of labor, calculated in the previous section, to the real 
wage rate in the manufacturing sector, with a normalization of its value to unity in 1972. Even though 
it was subject to some variation, the figure documents a rising trend in the wage-productivity gap, 
especially after late 1970s. 
                                                           















On the other hand, Figure 2 illustrates the joint behavior of the MPL-to-W ratio and the 
unemployment rate in Turkey from 1950 to 2008. Even by visual inspection we can observe a strong 
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Having illustrated the behavior of these variables, we now estimate the following regression equation: 
 
In this specification, GAP refers to the MPL-to-W ratio, U to the unemployment rate  for are the 
explanatory variables other than the unemployment rate for k=2,3…n. Finally,   is the error term. 
In Table 2, we present the results of this estimation using different estimation methods in 5 different 




 technique with OLS and FGLS (denoted by OLS-IV and FGLS-IV respectively) and finally 
an OLS estimation with one-period lagged MPL-to-W ratio among the explanatory variables. The 
immediate conclusion drawn from Table 2 is that the coefficient of unemployment is statistically 
significant and positive in different regressions we have run. None of the explanatory variables, other 




                                                           
11 As we have explained in the previous subsection, we instrument unionization rate on the number of strikes, as 
the unionization data is very disputed in the Turkish case and therefore very much prone to measurement error. 8 
 
 
2.3  Second Pass of Empirical Analysis 
The estimation techniques we used in the first pass of our empirical analysis were implicitly assuming 
that the series we were considering are all stationary. However, as one can also visually suspect from 
the Figure 2, at least unemployment and the MPL-to-W ratio series might be non-stationary. To check 
this, Table 3 reports the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests we have performed for 
unemployment and MPL-to-W ratio. As the results clearly indicate there is strong evidence that both 
unemployment and MPL-to-W ratio are integrated
12
 
 of order 1.  
 
 
Having documented that both series we are considering have a unit root, we now want to check 
whether there exists a cointegrating relationship between them and if it exists what the direction of this 
relationship is. For that purpose, we estimate the following standard cointegrating equation: 
12 t tt Gap u αα ε = ++  
Moreover, following Gregory and Hansen (1996a, 1996b) we also take into account the possibility of 
a structural break in the cointegrating relationship.
13
12 3 t t tb t Gap u α α αφ ε = +++
  To perform this we hypothesize 4 different 
structural break specifications: The first one implies a level shift in the cointegrating relationship: 
 
In the above defined specification  0 tb φ = if tb <  and  1 tb φ = otherwise. In this specification b is the 
year of the potentially existing structural break. The second specification assumes a level shift with the 
presence of a time trend: 
12 3 4 t t tb t Gap u t α α αφ α ε = + + ++  
                                                           
12 The only series, other than unemployment and the MPL-to-W ratio, which are integrated of order 1 are 
unionization and the number of strikes. For more details see the third subsection of this section. 
13 Visual inspection of the Figure 2 also reveals hints on the presence of a structural break either in late 70s or early 90s. 9 
 
The third specification hypothesizes a cointegrating relationship with a regime shift where both 
intercept and slope coefficients change 
12 3 4 t t tb t tb t Gap u u α α αφ α φ ε = +++ +  
And finally, we also examine a relationship with a egime shift where the intercept and the slope 
coefficients change along with the trend, i.e. 
12 3 4 5 6 t t tb tb tb t t Gap u t t u α α αφ α αφ αφ ε = + + ++ + +  
Table 4 below reports the results of the Gregory-Hansen structural break tests. The break year is 
endogenously reported by the test by estimating the cointegration equations for all possible break 
dates. The test then chooses a break date where the test statistic is the minimum or equivalently the 
absolute ADF test statistic is at its maximum.
14 The results in Table 4 imply that in all the four 
hypothesized relationships with structural breaks, there is cointegration between the wage productivity 
gap and unemployment. 
 
The break dates are 1990 in the first two specifications without the regime change and 1977 in the 
models with regime change. Moreover, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected in all the 
four models with structural break.  
As argued by Rao (2006), statistical techniques are only tools to summarize empirical facts and do not 
necessarily yield answers in line with economic theory and/or intuition. However, the structural break 
years determined by the tests we run are not very surprising. 1977 is a year which according to Çiçek 
and Elgin (2011b) is the starting year for the Turkish depression and 1990 is the initial year of a 
politically and economically very volatile decade for the Turkish economy. Not specifically preferring 
one model to the other, next we proceed to estimate the cointegrating equations for all of these four 
models with the Engle–Granger method. The first stage OLS equations are given below in Table 5 
                                                           
14 See the cited papers for critical values. 10 
 
together with the standard cointegration equation without any structural break
15. The estimates of all 
these five models all imply a positive correlation between unemployment and MPL-to-W ratio. This 
illustrates that the positive correlation between unemployment and the wage-productivity gap is robust 
to different econometric specifications. 
 
 
2.4 Third Pass of Empirical Analysis 
Finally, as a third pass of the empirical analysis, we investigate whether there exists a trivariate long 
run relationship between unemployment, wage-productivity gap and the number of strikes which we 
intend to use as a proxy for the bargaining power of workers.
16 Our motivation for conducting such an 
analysis is motivated from our intention to account for the observed positive correlation between 
unemployment and the wage-productivity gap through the bargaining power of workers using a 
search-matching model of employment.
17
To perform the trivariate analysis, we first check whether the “strikes” series is integrated of order 1. 
The ADF test yields a value of -2.536 whereas the 5% critical value is 2.925. On the other hand, when 
differenced for one period ADF test statistic becomes -8.671 which lets us to conclude that the strikes 
series is integrated of order 1. Next, using the Johansen test for cointegration we check the 
cointegrating rank of the relationship and find out both the trace and eigenvalue tests indicate the 
presence of two cointegrating relationships at 5% critical value.
 
18
                                                           
15 The cointegration tests we performed indicate the existence of one cointegrating relationship in the case without structural 
break. Due to space constraints we do not these test results. However, they are available upon request from the corresponding 
author.  
 
16 Our results do not change qualitatively when we use unionization instead of the number of strikes as a proxy for bargaining 
power. 
17 The intuition will be made clearer in the next section of the paper. 
18 Results of these tests are available upon request from the corresponding author.  11 
 
The two estimated cointegraing equations are available in Table 6. As we can see from the table, both 




(i.e. bargaining power of workers.) What these results suggest is that declining (increasing) bargaining 




Having empirically established that the bargaining power plays a role in determining the relationship 
between unemployment and the wage-productivity gap, next, we turn to building a model to account 
for this relationship. 
3. Model 
The observed dispersion between marginal productivity of labor and wages suggests a deviation from 
the competitive equilibrium outcome in which workers are paid their marginal product. Walrasian 
equilibrium theory is an important benchmark to start with for modeling wage determination, however 
it fails when confronted with data which pave the way to models with frictions in the labor market. 
Main line of research in this area focuses on search frictions, which is pioneered by Mortensen and 
Pissarides
20
3.1 Model Environment 
. In this section, our main focus is on the wage determination and the implications of 
Mortensen and Pissarides framework. Details of their model, which are not directly relevant to our 
analysis, are left out and reader is referred to Pissarides (2000) for a comprehensive exposition of their 
model.  
Mortensen-Pissarides model considers a labor market with a costly search process both for workers 
and firms
21
                                                           
19 Again, we want to emphasize that result are similar when we use unionization instead of number of strikes. 
. This imperfection in the labor market is characterized by a matching function which can 
20 See Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) for an extensive review of these models. 
21 The main difference in our approach is to endogenize the job finding rates in the bargaining game, which defines the 
probability of getting an outside offer and the continuation value in the game. 
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be thought as a reduced-form representation of these frictions, denoted by  , where  is the 
number of unemployed workers who are searching for a job and  stands for the number of open 
vacancies. Matching function defines job finding probability,  , for the workers and probability for 
a firm to fill an open vacancy,  where   is the labor market tightness. Matching function 
exhibits constant returns to scale and strictly increasing and concave in both arguments which implies 
that  is an increasing function of labor market tightness and   is a decreasing function of   . 
Workers and firms are risk-neutral hence they maximize the present discounted value of their lifetime 
income and the equilibrium is characterized by a series of Bellman equations. We do not introduce any 
heterogeneity to the model hence all workers and firms are identical. Whenever a worker and a firm 
form a match, they create a surplus to be divided according to a sharing rule. Pissarides model relies 
on the generalized Nash bargaining solution in determining the wage share of the worker and profit 
share of the firm. Shares of each party in the match is determined according to their bargaining powers 
and outside options. We denote the bargaining power of the worker by β. Bargaining power β, is the 
main force which drives the wage share and it is treated as exogenous by the model. The idea here is 
that whenever a worker and a firm are in a match, they form a monopoly on the surplus generated by 
the match, and it is not possible to talk about market clearing wage as in the Walrasian equilibrium. 
Our theoretical goal in this section is to provide a model, which relates the bargaining power to the 
structural parameters, and understand how bargaining power responds to changes in market 
conditions. We will use the bargaining game proposed by Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2003) as 
our benchmark and extend their game for search and matching models of the labor market.This will 
allow us to extend  search-matching model explained above by endogenizing the bargaining power β. 
 
The bargaining outcome of a match is modelled as an equilibirum of an infinite horizon alternating 
offers bargaining game a la Rubinstein (1982). We assume complete information such that both parties 
know the other party’s  type and all wage offers are common knowledge. Workers and firms are 
homogenous and make alternating offers. When worker makes an offer then it is either accepted or 
rejected by the firm. We denote wage offer by the worker as   and wage offer by the firm as   If 
the offer accepted then worker and firm start producing. If firm rejects the offer then after a short 
period of time,  , firm makes a counter-offer to the worker,  . Bargaining game continues in this 
fashion over an infinite horizon. We assume that during the bargaining game workers and firms can 
execute their outside options. Workers get outside offers at rate  , if thay take it they start 
bargaining with another firm,  and  similarly for the firms with the corresponding rate,    We 13 
 
assume that matches are separated at rate   Observe that continuation value of the worker and the firm 
when they take an outside offer is identical to the outcome of the initial game because workers and 
firms are homogenous therefore all wage bargains are identical., 
This game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium which is characterized by strategies of the 
worker and the firm in which both parties offer a wage to make the other party indifferent between 
accepting or rejecting the offer. Therefore,  and   solves the following equations: 
 
                         (5) 
 
 
                     (6) 
 
is the value of a worker who accepts the offer of the firm,  Right hand side of the equation 
gives the value of the worker if she rejects the offer. First term states the probability that match is not 
destroyed and worker does not get an outside offer in which case worker makes a counter offer  . 
With probability  , match is destroyed and worker get the reservation value which is given by    and 
with probability   worker gets an outside offer and obtains the continuation value of the game. 
Note that if worker starts bargaining with another firm, the game is identical to the initial one, because 
firms and workers are homogenous. The second equation describes the situation of the firm.  
An equilibrium is a pair of stationary strategies for the firm and the worker in which each party makes 
the other party indifferent between accepting or rejecting the offer at hand. The bargaining game has a 
unique subgame prefect equilibrium characterized by a fixed sharing rule of the surplus between 
agents. Equilibrium is characterized in the following proposition.  
 
Proposition (1):  In equilibrium there exists a unique wage offer w, which satisfies 
                                    =   -                                    (7) 
 14 
 
Proof:  Delegated to the appendix. 
 
The unique equilibrium of this game can be approximated by the generalized Nash bargaining with 
exogenous share parameters. This proposition states that when we relate the outcome of the game to 
the structural parameters of the bargaining game, we can explicitly get the share parameters as a 
function of these parameters. The advantage of this approach is that we can derive the bargaining 
power endogenously. As a comparison, we reproduce the Nash bargaining outcome in the search and 
matching model with fixed bargaining power: 
 
- )                                                    (8) 
 
By using (7) and normalizing the share parameters we obtain the bargaining power in the range [0,1]. 
The bargaining power of the worker (and the firm) depends on the discount rate and the match 
separation rate, which is also called as the “level effect” because it affects both the worker and the firm 
in the same way. “Marginal effect” is the effect of match finding rates on the bargaining power, which 
is determined by labor market conditions. In this sense, the following proposition presents the 
relationship between the bargaining power and labor market tightness. 
 
Proposition (2):  Bargaining power of the worker is monotonically increasing in labor market 
tightness, i.e.     where    . 
Proof:  Delegated to the appendix. 
If the aggregate unemployment level in the labor market is higher, then the bargaining power of the 
worker decreases and the worker tends to settle for a lower wage in the bargaining game, since higher 
unemployment implies higher matching rates for firms and lower matching rates for workers due to 
lower market tightness. 
3.2 Calibration 
In this subsection, we use our result from the previous subsection and estimate the bargaining power 
of the average worker (or firm) in Turkish manufacturing. In order to do that we calibrate the model by 
treating bargaining power as endogenous given by proposition (2). In the calibration analysis, we need 
to assign values to the parameters of the model, to the extent possible, based on long run or 
microeconomic data. Again, referring to Pissarides (2000) parameters of the model are discount rate , 15 
 
job separation rate  cost of posting a vacancy  , productivity parameter  , unemployment benefit   
and parameters, which identify the matching, function. In the calibration of the model we assume that 
matching function takes the following functional form: 
                                                            (9)                                                                         
Here  is the parameter, which governs the efficiency of the matching process and   is the elasticity of 
the matching function with respect to unemployment. With the parameters of the matching function 
the total number of parameters is six. In the literature, additional to these parameters we need to 
choose a value for bargaining power,   because it is another exogenous parameter of the model. The 
steady-state equations that one can use for the calibration are three
22
                                          
                                                                                                    
                                                                  (10)         
 
                                                         =                                                                    (11)   
 
                                                                                                                    (12) 
Equation (10) gives the steady-state unemployment as a function of job separation rate and job finding 
rate of the workers. Equation (11) is the job creation condition and equation (12) derives the 
equilibrium wages at the steady state. As the reader may have noticed, together with the bargaining 
power, number of parameters in the model is seven, however we have three steady-state equations for 
calibration and in that sense calibration of the search and matching model is rather uncontroversial. 
Therefore results differ greatly across calibrations depending on different identification assumptions. 
We start with the parameters, which leave little room in assigning values. The calibration analysis 
follows closely Shimer (2005), Hall (2005) and Boz et.al (2009). We treat one unit of time in the 
model as representing a year dictated by our data set and we pick    We  normalize 
productivity to unity and set  . Elasticity of the matching function is obtained from Petrongolo 
and Pissarides (2001) and taken to be equal to  . The value for the unemployment benefit varies 
across calibrations. OECD Employment Outlook calculates the replacement rates. We pick the average 
and set   . For the cost of posting a vacancy we rely on Boz et.al (2009) and pick their value 
                                                           
22 See Pissarides (2000) for derivations. 
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 for our analysis. Finally, we set job separation rate   following Taşçı and Tansel 
(2005). 
 
Table 7: Calibrated Parameters 
Parameter  Value  Source 
Steady-State discount factor    0.014  Real interest rate 
Cost of posting Vacancy    0.127  Boz et.al (2009) 
Elasticity- matching function     0.5  Petrongolo Pissarides (2001) 
Unemployment benefit    0.4  OECD (1996)  
Productivity    1  Normalized 
Matching efficiency    0.778  Boz et. al. (2009) 
Job separation rate     0.06  Taşçı and Tansel (2005) 
 
The calibrated parameters are presented in Table 7. 
So far, we have used micro evidence and the insights from the literature to choose the parameter 
values. For the other parameters of the model, literature takes different approaches. Shimer (2005) 
does not use the wage equation in his calibration and set   and choose the bargaining power to be 
equal to the elasticity of the matching function. The main rationale behind this parameter choice is the 
Hosios condition which states that efficiency of the search and matching model requires   
However, it is not clear why we should treat the market equilibrium as efficient. This choice is still the 
most intuitive way to pick the value for   because we do not have enough micro evidence to pin down 
the value for the bargaining power. This is an issue that we overcome in this paper by endogenizing 
the  .  
Looking at the wage equation implied by the model, one can directly see that equilibrium wages 
depend explicitly on the choice of the bargaining power. Our approach differs mainly at this point. In 
the previous section, we have derived the bargaining power as a function of the exogenous and 
endogenous variables in the model. An advantage of doing this is that using this result, we can impose 
more discipline to our calibration exercise and then directly back out an estimate for the bargaining 
power of the workers in Turkish labor market. 17 
 
Now we will use the steady-state equations (10), (11) and (12) to calibrate the remaining parameters 
and calculate the steady-state equilibrium. Equilibrium of this model is a triple,  . We will treat 
the bargaining power as endogenous and use Proposition (2) in our calibration. We target long-run 
averages in our data set. First, we calculate average unemployment rate, which is equal to 8.13% and 
set this value as our target. (Target 1). Second, we calculate the average wage-productivity ratio as 
0.603 (Target 2). We need to pin down the values for labor market tightness,  and we will back out 
the value of the bargaining power of workers implied by the model. 
Using the steady-state equations and our target values obtained from the long-run averages in the data, 
we are able to pin down uniquely the values for labor market tightness and the bargaining power of the 
worker. 
The average labor market tightness   is calculated as 0.8749, which is close to the estimate by Saglam 
and Günalp (2012), which provides estimates for labor market tightness. Finally, as the main point of 
our analysis, we calculate the average bargaining power of the worker as     for the time 
period 1950-2009. 
We also want to see how bargaining power has changed between 1950 and 2009. To see this we have 
divided our data set into six periods, 1950-1959, 1960-1969, 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999 and 
2000-2009. Then we repeat the same procedure to obtain estimates of the bargaining power for these 
subperiods. The following table summarizes our results. 
Table 8:  Bargaining Power Estimates and Unemployment Rate 
Period  Average Bargaining Power  Unemployment Rate 
1950-1959  0.5775  2.56 
1960-1969  0.5465  3.26 
1970-1979  0.4855  6.45 
1980-1989  0.3761  7.76 
1990-1999  0.3480  7.81 
2000-2009  0.2775  9.88 
 
First of all, as we can see from Table 8,  there is a significant negative correlation between the 
bargaining power of the workers and the aggregate unemployment rate, which confirms our empirical 
results. When the unemployment rate is high, then workers’ relative position in the bargaining is 
weakened, therefore they tend to settle for lower wages and as a result of that the wage-productivity 
gap widens. Another important point we observe from the Table 8 is the steady decline of the 18 
 
bargaining power of the workers in Turkish labor market. We think that this observation is due to the 
reduction in the power of labor unions. Notice that this is also consistent with the third pass of our 
empirical analysis in the previous section.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
   In this paper, we make a unique aggregate observation and document a positive correlation between 
wage-productivity gap and unemployment rate in Turkish manufacturing sector. According to our 
empirical results, this conclusion is robust to different econometric specifications and to the inclusion 
of a structural break in the time-series data. 
   Moreover, we also provide an economic mechanism, which can account for the observed 
relationship between wage-productivity gap and unemployment. Our theoretical approach relies on an 
extension of a search and matching model and tries to understand the implications of the model on the 
wage-productivity gap and its relation with unemployment. Our main observation is that bargaining 
power of the workers is crucial in the determining the evolution of the wage-productivity gap and it is 
also a driving force for the correlation between this gap and the unemployment rate. Our main 
theoretical result is that higher unemployment rate in the labor market is associated with higher wage-
productivity gap and lower bargaining power in Turkish manufacturing.  
 
This is not only a phenomenon of the Turkish labor market. In a companion paper, Elgin and Kuzubas 
(2012), we make a similar observation in a panel data setting for the OECD countries. In this paper, 
with the availability of more comprehensive data sets, a full-fledged stochastic general equilibrium 
model of the labor market will provide us with a better understanding of the issues discussed in this 
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Proof of Proposition 1: The unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinite horizon bargaining 














We divide these equations by   and taking limit as   and let   we get: 
 
                 - [   /          
 
Note that     /   = 1, in search and matching model, left hand side is equal to 1. Rearranging the 
terms yields: 
 =   
Note that the equilibrium value of posted vacancy    because of the free entry of the firms 
and  because the subgame starts when either party takes an outside offer is identical to 
the whole game thus they yield the same equilibrium wage offer. The same reasoning holds for the 
firm, i.e  We define the total surplus generated by the match to be divided between 
worker and firm is equal to: 
 
Imposing free entry and equality between the value from the game and continuation value we obtain 
                                             =   
Rearranging yields the result. 
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Proof of Proposition 2: Proof of this proposition is straightforward and only requires differentiating  
 
with respect to   and using   and    
 
 